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• Agenda 
– Background on the EVA batteries 
– Motivation and objectives 
– Trigger method selected and why 
– Assessments of current designs 
– Verification of subscale mitigation measures 
– Full scale LREBA with those measures leads to failure 
– Consequence of cell TR ejecta products to TR propagation 
– Full scale LREBA with adjacent cells protected from cell vent path 
– Bank test to verify benefits of cell fusing 
– Lessons learned to date 
 
Background - Li-ion Rechargeable EVA Battery 
Assembly (LREBA) 
1 
9P-5S Array of Samsung 2.6Ah 18650 cells to power the 
spacesuit helmet lights and camera and glove heaters 
Background – Li-ion Pistol Grip Tool Battery 
• 10-cell Li-ion 18650 
battery 
– 10S for discharge 
– 2P-5S for charge 
• Battery is enclosed in 
tool holster except for 
end with the D-latch 
 
Background – EMU Long Life Battery (LLB) 
Design Features 
• 80 Li-ion cells (16p-5s) 
• ICR-18650J from E-one Moli Energy 
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Background and Motivation 
• NASA is no longer only relying on prevention 
measures for reducing single cell internal short 
hazard 
– Cell screening known to not be fool proof against 
latent defects that can lead to field failures 
– Reasonable design and operational measures have 
been shown to reduce severity 
• Revised battery safety standard (JSC 20793 
RevC) requires determining the hazard by test in 
all designs > 80Wh and assessing possible 
severity mitigation measures 
• This assessment is a pathfinder for that 
approach and will be done on 3 EVA batteries 
 
Selected Bottom Patch Heaters For Triggering TR 
• Two small (3/4”x3/4”) patch heaters located on the bottom of 
cylindrical can 
– Nichrome wire glued to Mica paper 
– Adhered to bare can by cement bases adhesive 
• Each has 6” of Nichrome wire for a total of 12” per pair 
– Pair can be powered by up to 90W 
• Main benefit of design – more relevant cell internal short 
– Deliver high heat flux away from seals, PTC, and CID located in cell header 
– leaves an axial bond line undisturbed for gluing cell together in one plane 
– More likely to result in coincident cell venting and TR runaway 
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Cell TR Response vs Heat Power 
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• TR output heat fairly independent of heater input power 
• High power preferred to reduce risk of biasing hot adjacent cells 
LREBA 9P Bank Test – Baseline Design 
• Picket fence 9P bank with cells in 
axial contact and with epoxy bond 
line between cells 
– End cell trigger with 45W 
– Open air environment 
• Full cascade of cell TR propagation 
in about 10 minutes 
• Similar result found with LPGT brick 
• LREBA and LPGT baseline designs 
found susceptible to TR propagation 
LPGT brick post TR Test 
First Round of Mitigation Measures 
• Ensure cell-cell spacing 1-2mm with 
FR4/G10 capture plates 
– Reduce thermal conduction from cell to 
cell 
• Integrate fusible links into Ni-201 bus 
plates on positive only 
– Isolate cell with internal shorts from 
parallel cells 
– 15A open current 
– Reduce thermal conduction via 
electrical connection 
• Include radiation barrier between 
cells in 2mm spacing design 
• Test under inert gas 
– Reduce chaos associated with burning 
cell ejecta 
• Results 
– No TR propagation in all 4 tests 
conducted in inert gas 
• Radiation barriers helped slightly 
• But spacing between cells found most 
significant 
– Picket fence design propagated in inert 
gas 
– In open air, propagation was likely due 
to flammable ejecta impinging on 
adjacent cells 
Full Scale Battery Test – Total Propagation 
• End cell in corner of dogleg was triggered. 
• All 45 cells went into TR over 29 minutes. 
• 231 seconds from trigger cell TR to adjacent cell TR 
• Flames exited housing after 5th cell driven into TR 11 
minutes into the test 
• Vented ejecta bypassed fusible links and created 
short paths 
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Bank 1 experienced a sustained short immediately 
after TR of trigger cell 
Cell TR Ejecta Assessment 
• Trigger cell next to 0% SoC cell without bus bars and with bank inside LREBA 
enclosure to assess if TR ejecta can electrically bridge between cells 
• Cell 2 appears to have been thermally overstressed causing its sealing gasket to 
melt 
– This cell definitely vented, albeit without going into TR 
– Internal gas temperatures in inside LREBA enclosure exceeded 230C 
– All other cells, #3-9 have healthy OCVs 
– Cell TR ejecta found to be electrically conductive 
• Either way, it indicates that design must  
– Manage the cell TR ejecta to prevent collateral damage 
– Reduce trip current of fusible links 
– Fusible links are more effective on negative terminal 
Next Full Scale LREBA Test Configuration 
Cell Ejecta Exhaust Piped Top 
• Macor (machinable glass 
ceramic) with G10 gasket 
between Ni bus and manifold 
top 
• Matching holes in housing for 
pipes 
• Mica paper wrapped on cell 
cans 
• Fusible bus bars on both 
positives and negatives 
• Same 15A trip 9P bank inside LREBA housing with exhaust holes 
Details of new mitigation features 
• Gen 1 LREBA capture and Ni bus plates with same housing/lid 
• Special care to avoid heater wire termination to damage cell case 
– Added mica paper between termination and cell case 
• Exhaust pipe manifold material Macor (machinable glass ceramic) 
– Very carefully fastened it to the G10 capture plate 
• Place 3 layers of Kapton and 0.005” G10 gasket in between G10 capture plate and 
Macor manifold 
• Kapton layers are compliant and help seal the Macor/G10 gap 
– Al tape added top of pipes to seal pipes of non-trigger cells to fresh limit air 
circulation 
• Added Mica paper insulation to the cell cans of non-trigger cells 
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More Photos of Mitigation Features 
Mica paper as radiation barriers and to 
electrically isolate cell cans 2-8 
Heater placed on end cells 1 & 9 
Machinable glass ceramic (Macor®) 
Fusible (15A) bus plates connected on 
both terminals 
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Pre Test Photos 
One active 9P bank in dogleg with end 
cell trigger heaters  powered at 90W 
4 dummy banks uncharged to take up 
volume inside enclosure 
Al foil covering housing ejecta holes to 
limit air circulation and prevent FOD 
entering 
No TR Propagation 
Half of heater fails open in first second, heater runs at 45W, nevertheless, TR reached in 72s. Bottom of trigger 
cell reaches 543C, while mid and top get to 319-344C. Cell 2 maxes out on all 3 TCs at 100C. 
Close-up 
Trigger cell pipe exhaust peaks at 500C 
Up even closer 
TR of trigger cell shorts the bank for ~1s, which blows open the positive & negative fuse of trigger cell, also 
positive link in cell 2 was found blown. The 15mV drop shown corresponds to 2.25A peak from the bank, not 
enough to blow 15A fusible links. But, data collected at 1Hz and may have missed true bottom of voltage dips.  
Trigger Cell Positive Fusible Link Opens 
At video time 13m:18s 
Cell Venting 
At video time 13m:19s 
Trigger Cell TR 
At video time 13m:20s 
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Post Test Photos 
• Bank voltage at 4.07V 
• Isolated Cell 2 voltage measured at 
2.5V (blown positive fuse) on 8/27 and 
1.1V on 8/29 
• Internal soft short suspected 
• Megaohms measured between cell 4-9 
cans and housing 
• Negative fuse on trigger cell also found 
blown 
Preliminary Findings of Test 
• TR of trigger cell was not uniformly hot 
– Only bottom TC > 500C 
– Top and mid did not exceed 350C 
• Half of heater failed, yet TR reached in 72s 
– DPA of cell will determine if it internal temperatures exceeded melting temp of Al (660C) and 
where besides the bottom. 
• Data was not truly collected at 10 Hz 
– Limitation in the Labview data system makes it fail to increase data collection frequency 
• Cell 2 Status 
– Cell 2 experienced an external short sufficient to blow its 15A positive fuse 
– No TR, but it subsequently experienced a soft internal short 
• Hopefully, DPA of cell will reveal why 
• Its hot tabs may have overheated portions of adjacent separators layers  
 
Opened 
cell2 (+) link 
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DPA Resistance Measurements 
• OCV of C2 
– 2.5V on 8/27 (hrs after run 53) 
– 1.1V on 8/29 
– 0V on 9/3 
• Resistance (9/3) 
– C2+ to Trigcell can = 2 M 
– C2+ to C3 can = 10 M 
– C2+ to (-) bus = 13 M 
• C2 has very high internal 
resistance and is at 0% SoC 
– Trig+ to (+) bus = 0.35 
• Ejecta bridge 
– C2+ to (+) bus = 8 M 
• No remaining evidence that 
C2 was externally shorted 
• DPA of Trigger cell & C2 next 
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LREBA2 9P Bank Design Features 
• G10 capture plates with thread holes for fastening to housing and lid 
• Ni bus strips with fusible links as narrow as 0.3mm with 4 sense tabs 
to make them interchangeable for each bank position 
– 6x6 mm lands for welding to cells 
• 0.005” G10 Ni strip cover 
Macor cell ejecta pipe manifold compatible 
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Fusible Link Verification Test 
• Use G10 capture plates to seat the 
Ni bus plates and weld them to 
cells 
• Use Ni bus tabs to put specified 
currents for blow tests 
• Test new bus plate design at 
relevant conditions 
– With cells welded to the Ni bus 
plates 
– 0.3mm to be tested at 8A (+ 2 reps) 
– 0.4mm to be tested at 9A (+ 1 rep) 
– 0.5mm to be tested at 11A (+ 1 rep) 
– 0.6mm to be tested at 13A (+ 1 rep) 
Ambient Fusible Link Blow Tests 
• 0.3mm links blew at 8A in ~1s 
• 0.4mm links blew at 9A in ~2-7s 
• 0.5mm links blew at 11A in ~2s 
• 0.6mm links blew at 13A in ~15s 
Fused open link (0.5mm) 
Vacuum blow tests remain to be done 
Fusible Links 
in Action 
View of the cell negatives 
• Cell voltage sense tabs 
routed under tile and 
terminated with fiberglass 
insulated wire 
• 9P bank is immobilized 
with wire tie down to tile 
• Heater LED functions 
• Notes 
• bead of epoxy exist 
between each cell to 
promote thermal 
conduction 
• Negative fuses are 
rated at 7A 
• Positive fuses are 
rated at 8A  
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Open Air 9P Fusible Links Test 
All bank voltage dives to zero volts last only 0.1s and probably due to noise 
All longer lasting dips in bank voltage coincide with fuse events 
Anomalous loss of OCV6 with TR of cell 1 
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F1 Blows 
Timing of Video of Negatives 
• Heater on  0:07 
• F1 blows  0:47 
• C1 pop  1:03 
• C1 TR  1:17 
• Heater off  1:17 
• F2 glows  2:51 
• F2 blows  5:14 
• C2 pop  6:22 
• C2 TR  6:23 
• F3 blows 6:54 
• C3 pop 8:01 
• C3 TR  8:15 
• F4 blows 9:01 
• C4 pop 10:30 
• C4 TR  10:41 
• F5 blows 11:16 
• C5 pop 11:35 
• C5 TR  12:51 
• F6 glows 14:34 
• F6 blows 15:08 
• C6 TR  18:04 
• F7 blows 18:31 
• C7 pop 18:50 
• C7 TR  19:53 
• F8 blows 23:28 
F6 glowing but not blowing 
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Close up with temperatures 
Cell 8 got just as hot as cell 7 prior to its TR. Not sure why propagation stopped after cell 7. 
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Fusible Link Test Findings and Forward Plan 
• Findings 
– TR propagated from cell 1 to cell 7 like dominos 
– Each cell TR events was proceeded with negative fuse blowing 
– Timing of bank OCV dips coincides with video timing of fuse 
glowing and blowing 
– Anomalous cell sense voltages drops to zero occurred 
– Nevertheless, we able to deduce that short circuit currents 
occur during the TR propagation process and fusible links are 
opened and should help mitigate propagation 
• Questions 
– What caused the propagation to end at cell 7? 
– What caused OCV1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6 to dive to zero after C1 TR? 
– OCV bounce back of cell 8 indicates that it was exposed to an 
external short and did not experience an internal short 
• Plan is to examine the test article and make resistance 
measurements. 
– Could the reflowed epoxy be electrically conductive? 
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Upcoming Tests 
• Trigger other end cell in full scale enclosure test 
– Trigger cell 9 from the same bank used in previous test 
– Collect data at 10 Hz 
– Get a TC secured on the inside of Macor pipe of trigger cell 
• Not the free air temp or inside diameter of housing hole 
• All other TC placements unchanged 
• LLB TR Severity with baseline design 
– Existing design assessment test (Run 1) could be performed 
next week 
• Further runs with LREBA2 parts due in by 9/12 
– Macor Pipe manifolds on order from TPI 
– Macor capture plates on order from Embree 
– Housing and lid order to be placed tomorrow 
– Planning populating battery with 5 banks with trigger cells to 
get statistically significant results 
– Need to work the impact to MLI garment designs on LREBA2 
 
Multi-Layer Insulation 
• Will need to add soft 
goods bag over 
LREBA that tolerates 
the hot ejecta and 
disperses it 
• Multi layer insulation 
may work 
– Example shown 
tolerated exposure on 
one side with little 
effect on the other side 
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Lessons Learned To Date 
• Design must prevent first TR propagation from initial 
failed cell 
• Limiting cell to cell thermal conduction appears to work 
– Maximizing heat conduction between cells and enclosure 
may also work according to modelling 
• Parallel cell bussing can provide significant in-rush 
currents into failed cell, which gets them hot 
• Radiative energy transfer alone is not the dominant 
contributor to TR propagation 
• Combustion of expelled electrolyte must directed away 
from adjacent cells 
• Cell TR ejecta can bridge to adjacent cells and cause 
cascading shorts 
• Most significant is control of cell vented/ejected 
products 
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